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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Several procedural problems were resolved in 1953. The notice of
appeal from the Board of Review to the common pleas court is sufficient
if the case be designated by docket number and the decision quoted.
Greater detail is unnecessary.5 Also, on appeal from the Board of Review
to the common pleas court, a claimant can correct the failure to make the
administrator a party and to serve him with nonce within thirty days.
Such is not a jurisdictional defect.6 Then if the common pleas court de-
termines the Board of Review order is "incorrect," the court of appeals
will reverse the judgment and remand the case. The statutory authority
for common pleas court action is to find the order "unlawful, unreason-
able, or against the manifest weight of the evidence."7
If the administrator discovers that an unemployment compensation
claim is void ab sn#:o, he can within three years vacate any action on the
claim. The provision making benefit determinations final after ten days
from the date of the order is not applicable to claims void ab snto.8
On the claimant rests the burden of proof to establish the right to
benefits. Failure to appear at the hearing or to offer evidence precludes
an administrative order granting benefits.9
OLIvER SCHROEER, JR.
WILLS AND ESTATES
Oral Contract to Make a Will
In 1953 a special statute of frauds was enacted in Ohio making unen-
forceable any agreement to make a will or to make a devise or bequest by
will unless such agreement was in writing and signed by the party making
it.1 The Ohio Supreme Court in Sherman v. Johnson2 held that by virtue
of this statute an agreement to make a will, etc., is not enforceable under
any crcumstances unless it is in writing. It further held that the statute
applies to any action instituted after its enactment, even though the ac-
tion, as in the principal case, involves an oral contract entered into before
its enactment, and even though performance of the contract had been
partially completed at the time of the enactment of the statute.
'Sander v. Board of Review, 92 Ohio App. 534, 111 N.E.2d 34 (1951)
'Joy Mfg. Co. v. Albaugh, 159 Ohio St. 460, 112 N.E.2d 540 (1953)
'Vest v. Board of Review, 93 Ohio App. 504, 114 N.E.2d 170 (1952)
'Cornell v. Perschillo, 93 Ohio App. 495, 114 N.E.2d 62 (1952)
*Gen. Motors Corp. v. Baker, 92 Ohio App. 301, 110 N.E.2d 12 (1952)
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Declaratory Judgment Action Proper for Determining
Whether Beneficiary Predeceased Testatrix
Freiberg v. Schloss3 was an action for a declaratory judgment. An
executor requested the probate court to determine and declare that Alice
Seeman, one of four beneficiaries named in the testatrix' will, had pre-
deceased testatrix and that the three other surviving beneficiaries were
entitled to divide the residue of decedents estate in equal thirds, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the will in the event any of the bene-
ficiaries predeceased the testatrix. Alice Seeman, the beneficiary whose
death was in issue, had not been heard from since 1942, when, according
to the evidence, she had been deported by the Nazis from her home in
Germany to Poland, under circumstances indicating that she had been.
executed within a few months after her disappearance. The testatrix
died in 1949. It was held that an action brought under the Declaratory
Judgments Act was proper, and that the plaintiff had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary predeceased the testa-
trix and, therefore, was entitled to nothing under the will of the testatrix.
The court further determined that neither the Presumed Decedents' Act
nor the Determination of Heirship law was applicable.6
Replevin Statutes Available to Owner of Chattel Against
Executor or Administrator
That the replevin statutes are available to one who claims to own per-
sonal property and to be entitled to the immediate possession thereof,
where it is being wrongfully detained from hun by the personal represen-
tative of a decedent, was decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in Semrce
Transport Co. v. Matyas.7 In reversing the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, the court stated that if the plaintiff is the owner of the chattels, is
entitled to their possession, and there is no question as to any divided
interest in the chattels, he is not required to present a claim to an admm-
stratrix for them or to except to an inventory, for the reason that plain-
tiff has no claim against the estate and is not interested in the inventory.
The plaintiff is simply clatming a right to recover possession of his per-
sonal property, and the replevin statutes apply in favor of anyone who
HIOmo REv. CoDE 5 2107.04 (OHIo G N. CODE 5 10504-3a).
2159 Ohio St. 209, 112 N.E.2d 326 (1953).
'65 Ohio L Abs. 331, 112 N.E.2d 352 (Hamilton Probate 1953)
'OIo 11Ev. CODE § 2721.02 (OHio GEN. CoDE S 12102-1).
'OHIo REv. CODE § 2121.01 (OHIO GEN. CODE 5 10509-25)
6OHIo REv. CODE § 2123.01 et seq. (OHIO GEN. CODE S 10509-95 et seq).
T 159 Ohio St. 300, 112 N.E.2d 20 (1953).
'63 Ohio L Abs. 236 and 244, 108 N.E2d 741 (App. 1952).
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owns chattels and is entitled to their possession, as against anyone who
wrongfully detains the possession, regardless of who that person may be.
Will Contest: Naming and Serving Corporate Executor
In Corporate Capacity Insufficient
In an action to contest a will the Ohio Code 9 provides that all devisees,
legatees, heirs of the testator and other interested persons, including the
executor or administrator, must be made parties to the action. That such
requirement is not sufficiently complied with by listing the corporate
executor in the caption of the petition in the executor's corporate capac-
ity and serving summons upon it in its corporate capacity, even though the
corporation was not a legatee or devisee under the will, and even though
there was a reference to such defendant as executor in the body of the peti-
tion, was decided by the court of appeals in Martn v. Mansfield Savings &
Trust Nat. Bank.10
Devisee: Right to Bring Action for Cancellation of Deed
In Eysenbach v. Reilly," the court of appeals held that where a grantor
dies testate, the right to maintain an action to cancel a deed obtained from
the grantor by fraud and undue influence vests not in the grantor's execu-
tor, but in the grantor's devisee, who would have taken the property had
not the deed been wrongfully obtained.
Construction of Will
Enyeart v. Drwer12 was a suit for construction of a will in which
testatrix devised a farm to her son and her daughter for their lives, and at
their death to testatrx' nearest blood descendants. Testatrix died in 1922.
Both her son and daughter survived and took a life estate in the property.
In 1945, however, the son died intestate, leaving the plaintiff as his only
child and the nearest blood descendant of testatrix, except defendant, the
daughter of testatrix, who was still living. The question presented was
whether, on the death of the testatrix' son, the plaintiff took a vested
estate in fee simple in an undivided one-half interest in the realty, or
whether the defendant daughter, as survivor of the life tenants, became
possessed of a life estate in the entire property. On appeal on questions
of law and fact, the court of appeals held that the will created a single
life tenancy to be enjoyed by the son and the daughter until the death of
OHio REv. CODE § 2741.02 (OHIo GEN. CoDE S 12080).
1092 Ohio App. 465, 110 N.E.2d 814 (1952).
"92 Ohio App. 207, 109 N.E.2d 664 (1951).
"93 Ohio App. 500, 113 N.E.2d 739 (1952).
[Spring
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1953
one of them, and thereafter to be enjoyed by the survivor in the whole of
the property.
In Perdue v. Morrms,13 it was held that a will by which, in item two,
testator provided: " I give, devise and bequeath all my property both
real and personal to my wife. . At her demise, I request that each of
our children be given his or her proportionate share of the estate due
consideration being given to those children and persons working and car-
ing for the farm property," gives a fee simple tide to testator's wife.
In Routzong v. Minstermanw 4 testatrix' will provided: "the remainder
of my property I hereby will to my niece for her use in any
manner she may deem proper without any limit or restriction whatever,
with full power and authority, to sell or to exchange, and to reinvest any
of my property as she deems best. . It is, however, my wish and will
that she preserve as far as she conveniently can the identity of the prop-
erty and if any remains unused at her death it is my will that four
hundred dollars be paid to St. Paul's Reformed Church and that one
hundred dollars be paid to the Women's Missionary Society of said church.
Of the remainder of my property, I will five-sixth to my sister. "
Held: The will gives to the niece a life estate with power to consume
the principal. That portion of the estate remaining unconsumed at the
niece's death passes to the beneficiaries named as remaindermen in the
will.
Half and Half Statute
In Millar v. Millar,5 a wife in 1939 received 1350 shares of stock by
the will of her husband. In 1948 she received a stock dividend of 2700
shares of stock. In 1951 she died intestate and without issue, possessed
of the above 4050 shares of stock. Held: Under the "half and half"
statute,'6 which provides for the descent of property when a relict dies
intestate and without issue possessed of identical property which came
to the relict from the deceased spouse, only the original 1350 shares of
stock received from her husband's estate are identical and pass under the
"half and half" statute.
Appeal from Denial of Admission to Probate
It was held in In re Bowles' Estate' that proceedings to admit to pro-
bate lost, spoliated or destroyed wills are purely statutory in nature, and
"93 Ohio App. 538, 114 N.E.2d 286 (1952).
" 94 Ohio App. 281, 115 N.E.2d 54 (1952).
"114 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio App. 1953).
'aOHo REV. CODE § 2105.10 (OHio GEN. CODE § 10503-5)
1793 Ohio App. 461, 113 N.E.2d 259 (1952). For further proceedings in the case
see 66 Ohio L. Abs. 73, 114 N.E.2d 229 (App. 1953).
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